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Abstract
We use data from a pay reform in an insurance company to con-
trast diﬀerent theories of work motivations. The management installed
performance pay to boost sales in the customer service centre of the
company. The reform was successful. The bonus scheme gave the op-
erators both self-regarding and other-regarding incentives to increase
sales. The increase in sales does therefore not in itself help us identify
the underlying motivation of the workers. However, when we examine
the evolution of the design and impact of the scheme, we conclude
that the standard principal-agent model best explains the patterns in
our data.
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JEL: C23, C72, J33, M52
1 Introduction
This paper examines data from an insurance company that included a perfor-
mance bonus in its customer service unit, an inbound call centre. In addition
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to providing information to customers, the operators also sell insurance prod-
ucts. In fact, the bonus scheme we analyze was initiated to stimulate sales
in customer service.
Prior to the introduction of performance pay (2001) the customer service
unit was divided into teams, each consisting of 10 to 12 members. The pay
reform added a quarterly bonus to the salary of the operators. Individual
bonuses depended on team performance along three dimensions, sales, eﬃ-
ciency (increasing in the number of calls answered) and customer satisfaction.
To qualify for a bonus a team had to beat a pre-set sales target. If qualified,
the magnitude of the bonus increased in sales and in relative eﬃciency and
customer friendliness.
Comparing sales before and after the reform we find that introducing
performance pay was a success. Sales increased, both because the operators
answered more calls and because they sold insurance to a larger fraction of
the customers they served. The reform’s eﬀect on sales endures when we
control for sales in other divisions within the company not aﬀected by the
reform, and for a number of other factors that could have an impact on sales.
Our findings here are in line with several recent case studies of incentive pay.1
We have a second more ambitious aim with this paper. We want to use
our data to delineate the causal mechanisms behind the design and impact
of the pay reform. The principal-agent model is our benchmark. This model
builds on two premises, rationality and egoism and can be stretched in two
directions. We can expand the motivation of the management and employees,
or restrain their cognitive capacities. Recent experiments in behavioral eco-
nomics indicate that we need to take account of other-regarding and process
regarding preferences in order to understand the design and impact of com-
pensation contracts at work places, Fehr and Schmidt (2006) and (2007). In
organization theory it has long been argued that decision making processes
within firms are less coherent than the economic agency model envisages,
March (1994). The question we address is: How far do we have to stretch
the principal-agent framework in order to make sense of the patterns we
observe in the design and impact of the pay reform?
Our finding that productivity increases when a firm introduces monetary
incentives, is often taken as evidence that supports standard economic incen-
1See Prendergast (1999) for an overview of the emperical literature on performance
pay, and Chiappori and Salanie (2000) for a presentation of empirical studies of economic
contract theory more generally.
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tive theory. That conclusion is premature for two reasons. A full appraisal
of this framework also requires a careful examination of the design of the
pay reform. It is not enough to examine how workers adjust their behav-
ior to monetary incentives, we also have to consider how well the choice of
contracts square with the theory. A second concern is that although the
principal-agent model readily explains why employees work harder when the
management adds a performance bonus to an existing salary, this response is
also consistent with models that emphasize the importance of social prefer-
ences. Reciprocity motivated workers who care about fairness and generosity
work harder if they find the performance bonus generous and the process be-
hind the reform fair. In that case productivity increases not only, or primarily,
because the reform explicitly links pay to performance, but also because the
bonus is taken as a kind and fair act that workers want to reciprocate. Our
data strongly suggest that the operators appraised the bonus scheme to be
both fair and generous. Hence, the observation that the reform enhanced
productivity cannot in itself be used to discern the motivational hypothesis
we compare. To identify the causal mechanism behind the workers response
we need to examine the pay reform, and how workers adjusted to it, in greater
detail.
One type of information we use to identify the motivation behind the
employees’ response to the reform, is the severity of the multi-task problem
created by the reform: To what extent do workers exploit incompleteness
in the scheme to increase their own income (reduce their own costs) at the
expense of the company’s profit. Our data indicate that the employees took
advantage of the scheme in ways that are hard to reconcile with the idea
that it was reciprocity and fairness concerns that caused them to increase
sales eﬀort in the first place. On the other hand, the multi-task problems we
observe are easily explained within the standard principal-agent model.
As another identification strategy, we exploit the fact that the manage-
ment made an unfriendly or hostile modification of the scheme in 2004. The
initial contract was shaped in negotiations with representatives of the work-
ers and it had been renegotiated on a yearly basis until 2004. At that time
the management did not want to renew the existing bonus contract. They
refused to negotiate the contract with the workers and decided to implement
a bonus contract by dictate. If reciprocity and fairness concerns were signif-
icant motivations for the employees we should expect a subsequent drop in
sales productivity. There are no signs of such a response in our data.
Our research is an example of what Ichniowski and Shaw (2003 call "in-
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sider econometrics", and it contributes and extends the literature that ex-
ploits firm-level variation in compensation contracts to measure the eﬀect eco-
nomic incentives have on worker behavior, important examples are Paarsch
and Shaerer (1999), Lazear (2000) and Haley (2003). A novel aspect of our
research is the attention we pay to the design of the reform. Most empirical
studies of performance pay focus on how workers respond to monetary incen-
tives. The outline of the reform, and the process behind it’s design, is often
ignored, either because the plan is so simple that it warrants no discussion,
or because the researchers lack suﬃcient information about the scheme they
investigate. Hence, as researchers we know far too little about the forces
that are at play at the management level when compensations contracts are
shaped in a complexwork environment.2
Our research also supplements the experimental literature on reciprocity
and incentives. Several laboratory experiments indicate that “workers” have
social preferences, and that other-regarding and process-regarding concerns
have important implications for the design and impact of economic incen-
tives.3 Although it is crucial to find out to what extent these results extend
the laboratory, there are few studies that use field observations to gauge the
importance of altruism, fairness and reciprocity in work relations. In this
respect our paper fills a void in the literature.
The paper is organized in the following way. In the next section we
briefly present the customer service centre. Section three presents the wage
reform, both its initial outline and subsequent changes. Section four provides
a theoretical backdrop for our discussion. In section five and six we assess,
respectively, the design and impact of the scheme in light of the theoretical
perspectives we contrast.4
2There are, however, studies that use industry level data to assess how well standard
economic incentive theory predicts the choice of compensation contracts, see Parent and
MacLeod (1999) and Brown (1990).
3See Fehr and Falk (2002) for an overview of the literature that studies how monetary
incentives aﬀect other regarding behaviour. Fehr and Schmidt (2004) and Fehr, Klein
and Schmidt (2007) present expermental data on how fairness and reciprocity aﬀect the
design of incentive contracts.
4Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) use a field experiment with performance pay
to study work motivation. They find that productivity is higher with a piece rate bonus
than with a bonus that depends on relative performance evaluation within the work group.
They take this as evidence that there are social preferences among the workers.
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2 The work environment
We study an important occupation. More and more firms apply phone based
customer service to assist their customers. The nature of the services pro-
vided in call centres varies between work places. Some operators respond to
simple requests, they inform customers about their bank balances, or register
the purchase of a ticket, etc. Others must give detailed responses to intricate
questions. Our case belong to the latter category.
The phone system in the customer service centre automatically channels
new calls to available operators.5 The operators use the computer system
to retrieve information needed to assist customers, and to register new in-
formation in the customer data base. The operators’ main assignment is to
provide accurate information in a friendly and courteous way. Their job is to
inform existing clients about their insurance coverage, update them on any
policy changes that seem relevant and inform them about new products that
are available. To provide high-quality services the operators must pay care-
ful attention to the customers’ requests and have extensive knowledge about
the company’s insurance products. In addition, they must handle requests
for information as fast as possible in order to minimize the time other cus-
tomers have to wait for assistance. Ideally, most of the work, the provision
of information, changes in existing insurance contracts, registration of new
contracts etc., should be done on-line during the phone call.
The operators also sell insurance products. To do a good job, opera-
tors must balance the time and eﬀort spent on selling new products against
the time and eﬀort spent on customer service. Furthermore, selling insur-
ance products is not a one-dimensional task. It is well known that insurance
providers must take account of adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
Hence, it is important to collect information about the “type” of the cus-
tomers and use this information to design an appropriate insurance contract.
It is not in the company’s interest to maximize the number of sold insurance
products.
The customer service centre was restructured in July 2000. A new cus-
tomer service division was then established in the private lines of the in-
surance company. A central part of the reorganization was to divide the
5The customer service consultants make a few outbound calls to gather information
etc. They also call back customers that choose to leave their number instead of waiting
for an answer when the lines are congested.
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operators into diﬀerent teams, each consisting of 9 — 10 call-centre employees
and a team leader. The teams are clustered together in a big open oﬃce
landscape. When performance pay was introduced at the commence of 2001
there were around 200 individuals working in the service unit of the insurance
company, around 130 — 140 of these were employed at the call centre.
The team leaders organize the team work and motivate and supervise the
operators. In particularly strained periods — when the service level at the
centre is low, i.e. when the queue of waiting costumers is long — team leaders
will pick up the phone and answer inbound calls. Due to the fact that the
team leader has distinctively diﬀerent tasks than the team members, he/she
is not included in the bonus system we examine.
The operators are instructed to log on the phone system when they arrive
at work and not log oﬀ the system unless meetings — or other arrangements
- take them away from the phone system for more than an hour. Shorter
breaks should, according to the instruction, be included in time logged on.
On average the operators are logged on the system somewhat less than five
hours a day. The workload for a full time position is 7 hours and 30 minutes
a day. The gap between a full day and actual time logged on the system is
due to sickness absence, various meetings, courses and seminars. On average
an operator answers around 40 calls per day. This includes call-back calls. In
addition the operators make on average 7 or 8 outbound calls a day, normally
to gather essential information about customers’ insurance policies.
Most of the operators are relatively young, the average age is around 30
and the typical employee has 2 or 3 years of college education and has worked
for the insurance company for 4 years. There is a slight surplus of women
working in the customer service centre. Turnover is relatively high, although
it has dropped considerably since the reorganization of the customer service
unit. Those who leave the call centre either move to other divisions in the
insurance company, or leave for jobs outside the company.
3 The pay reform
The management began to discuss the introduction of a pay reform to in-
crease sales in customer service in the spring of 2000. Small scale, sporadic,
sales campaigns oﬀering small prizes to outstanding performance, had been
used earlier. But this reform was of a diﬀerent kind. The plan was to im-
plement performance pay on a more permanent basis and at a much larger
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scale than the sales campaigns that had been used earlier.
The design of the pay reform was shaped in negotiations with worker
representatives. The parties disagreed on several issues. The management
preferred a tournament based bonus scheme, while those representing the
workers favoured a system were the workers competed against preset stan-
dards. The management preferred a scheme that mainly rewarded individual
performance, while the representatives of the employees preferred team based
incentives. The most critical issue in the negotiations was how one should
handle sick absence. Due to these disagreements the negotiations dragged
and the contract was not signed before the last week of February 2001. How-
ever, the management and the union had agreed that if the negotiations
turned out successfully and a contract was signed it should be given retroac-
tive eﬀect and be in force as of January the 1st. In the initial contract the
parties also agreed to renegotiate the contract on a yearly basis.6
Since its introduction, the bonus scheme has been changed several times.
In this section we describe the outline of initial contract and its amendment
over time.
3.1 The initial contract
The initial contract was intricate. The bonus was based on team performance
and depended on three diﬀerent performance variables: sales, eﬃciency and
customer satisfaction.
Each team had to meet a prefixed sales target in order to qualify for a
bonus. The sales target was fixed at 102% of a team specific sales budget.
The sales budget was determined in a top-down process within the firm. First
the central management of the company specified an overall sales budget for
the whole company. The aggregate budget was then divided on diﬀerent
sales channels within the company. The customer service unit is one sales
unit and the management there divided their sales budget among diﬀerent
teams according to their manpower. Passing the sales target of 102% of a
team’s sales budget yielded 1250 kroner in quarterly sales bonus per team
member (average monthly pre tax wage was at that time approximately 22000
6The information we have on the outline of the pay reform is gathered from various
sources. We have had access to all written agreements between the parties. In addition
one of the authors participated in several managerial meetings where the implementation
of the pay reform was discussed. We have also interviewed the management and some of
the team leaders at the customer service centre.
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kroner). The sales bonus increased thereafter in a stepwise manner - with 8
steps - until a maximum reached at 130% of the sales budget, which yielded
each team member 2500 kroner in sales bonus.
Each team that sold more than 102 % of their budget could multiply
its sales bonus with a factor that depended on how eﬃcient and customer
friendly it was relative to the other teams.7 Eﬃciency was measured at the
team level as the number of incoming calls answered divided on the number
of hours team members were logged on the phone system. To assess cus-
tomer approval the company contacted a random selection of the customers
and asked them to grade the support they got from the service centre on a
scale from 1 to 7, with 7 as the highest score. The teams were then ranked
along these two dimensions, and those that belonged to the one third with
the lowest rank sum were considered as winners of the eﬃciency/costumer
approval tournament. The winners could multiply their sales bonus with a
factor of four. The next one third could multiply their sales bonuses with a
factor of three, while the one third with the highest rank score only received
their sales bonus. Teams that did well in the tournament but did not pass
the sales hurdle did not receive any bonus payments. A team that sold 130%
of the budget (or more) and was ranked in the best one third of the teams
in the tournament would get a bonus of approximately 15% of their regular
salary.
A critical question with respect to the sales bonus was to what extent
teams should be compensated for sick absence. The employees found it unfair
that sick absence among some operators should reduce other team members’
possibility to achieve a bonus. In the negotiations they required full sales
compensation. Their proposition was that an absent team member should
be ascribed the average sales in the team in the period that he or she was
away from work. The management was reluctant to accept this requirement.
The parties finally agreed on a compromise where teams were compensated
only for long term sick leave (if they were absent more than 14 days).
3.2 Changes in the contract
In the initial agreement the parties concurred to renegotiate the contract on
a yearly basis. All changes made in the negotiations should be implemented
7Note that a team would not receive a bonus unless it passed the sales target, no matter
how well it performed on other tasks.
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in the second quarter of that year. The performance pay scheme has been
altered several times in the period from 2001 until 2005.
At the first renegotiation, in 2002, the management agreed to extend the
sickness absence compensation to include short term absence, but only if
those absent could display a medical certificate confirming their illness.
In 2003 the parties agreed to add two new performance indicators to the
initial contract. One new variable was premium discount, measured as the
diﬀerence between the tariﬀ premium and actual premium of the insurance
products that were sold. Another variable that was included in the scheme
was the team’s claims ratio on its sold portfolio of insurance. Premium
discount and claims ratio were lumped together to measure the profitability
of sales; teams that gave a low premium discount and had a low claims ratio
scored high on profitability. In the rank order tournament “profitability”
accounted for 50% of the rank score; a team that was ranked as number 3 in
eﬃciency, 4 in profitability and 7 in customer service would get a total rank
sum of 3·0,25 + 4·0,5 +7·0,25 = 4,5).
In 2004 there was a radical change in the bonus program. The manage-
ment refused to renew the existing incentive contract. Negotiations broke
down because the management were no longer willing to compensate teams
for sick absence. The management suspected that this arrangement was mis-
used by some of the teams. Their impression was that in some teams, low
productivity members tended to turn "sick" in periods when it was important
to increase sales in the team (recall that absent workers would be assigned
the average sales productivity in the period they were away from work).
But although the management refused to sign the bonus contract in 2004,
they had not lost faith in the benefits of using monetary incentives to moti-
vate their employees. Hence, they decided to carry on with performance pay,
but now as quarterly campaigns. By relabeling the bonus scheme as quar-
terly campaigns the management did not have to negotiate the design and
terms of the bonus scheme with the union. Hence from the second quarter
of 2004 the design of the scheme was no longer shaped in negotiations with
representatives of the workers. The bonus scheme was now dictated by the
management .
The first campaign, introduced in the second quarter of 2004, was in many
respects a copy of the negotiated contract that was not renewed, but some
significant changes were made. Sick absence was no longer compensated.
The management also individualized the bonus scheme. The magnitude of
the sales bonus was unaltered, but only half of an operator’s sales bonus was
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based on team sales, the other half was based on individual sales. In addition
management eliminated eﬃciency and “profitability” from the scheme and
added two new performance measures. One was a “quality of work measure”
that was based on the number of omissions and mistakes in the contracts that
was sent to the customers. The other was related to changes in the renewal
rate of existing insurance contracts. The tournament between teams was also
abolished; the bonus associated with the “quality of work” and renewal of
policies depended on absolute, not relative performance.
The sales bonus was individualized further in the third quarter of 2004.
Now 75% of an operator’s sales bonus was based on individual sales, and
25% on team sales. Eﬃciency was reintroduced as a performance measure,
but in a much weaker form than before. Team level eﬃciency mattered only
in periods when the service level at the centre was low. The service level
is a measure of how long the average customer has to wait before she can
talk to a customer service consultant. A service level of 80 implies that
it takes 20 seconds to get in touch with a customer service consultant. A
lower service level implies that the customers have to wait longer. In this
quarter all operators received a small bonus in weeks were the average service
level at the centre was above 60%. If the service level fell below this target
only agents in teams with a weekly average eﬃciency above 5,2 (teams that
answered more than 5,2 calls per hour logged on) would earn the bonus. The
quality measure (mistakes made in the contract) was abolished. The renewal
measure was kept as before, and a new variable that depended on the overall
service level in the call centre was introduced. In the last quarter of 2004
there were no significant changes in the performance pay campaign. The
evolution of the bonus scheme is summarized in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 here]
4 Theoretical background
The pay reform was installed to increase sales of insurance products in the
customer service centre. Weekly sales at the centre can be written as
s = pγx, (1)
where x is the number of incoming calls per week, γ is the fraction of the
incoming calls answered, and p is the fraction of attended customers that
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buys an insurance product. The number of incoming calls is outside the
control of the operators, but their eﬀort and talent aﬀect sales via p and γ.
The longer operators are logged on the phone system and the faster they
serve each customer, the higher is the fraction of incoming calls that are
answered. The fraction of customers that purchase new insurance products
depends critically on the relative attractiveness of the company’s product,
but the talent and eﬀort of the operators also matter. Some individuals are
naturally gifted sellers, others must strive harder to convince a customer that
this insurance product is just what she needs.
Increasing sales eﬀort generates costs and benefits for the operators. To
answer more calls the operators must make fewer calls to friends and family,
take fewer breaks and chat less with their co-worker. In short, they have
to cut down on activities that give variation in a hectic workday. To sell
insurance to a higher fraction of attended customers, the operators must
make an eﬀort to learn more about available insurance products, pay more
attention to the customers to identify their needs and be a more assertive
seller of the company’s products.
On the other hand exerting eﬀort can be intrinsically rewarding and can
produce a variety of extrinsic benefits. What an employee recons as the
beneficial eﬀects of increasing eﬀort depends on her motivation (preferences).
But whatever it is that propel her work, at some level the marginal costs of
increasing eﬀort starts to outweigh the marginal benefits. At which level
the marginal costs starts to outweigh the benefits depends on the incentives
the employees face. The pay reform was initiated because the management
thought that the operators had insuﬃcient incentives to sell insurance prod-
ucts. A major concern for the management was the hazard that powerful
sales incentives could lower the quality of the services provided in the centre.
In this section we develop a simple formal model of the situation at the
call centre. The model is meant to be illustrative; we do not attempt to
estimate parameters of the model in our empirical section, but we believe
this formal set-up gives credence to our emperical set-up and to the patterns
we later use to set apart diﬀerent behavioral hypothesis.
Consider a customer service consultant allocating eﬀort on two tasks, sales
and service. Let a be the eﬀort the agent exerts on sales and e the eﬀort he
exerts to provide high quality services. The preferences of the operator can
be represented by this utility function
u(a, e) = w + λy − 1
2
(a− a∗)2 − 1
2
(e− e∗)2 − 1
2
(a+ e)2, (2)
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where w is the wage that the worker receives, y is the income the principal
earns and λ signifies the value a worker assigns to the income earned by the
principal. λ can be positive or negative. With this specification the direct
utility eﬀect of increasing sales- and service eﬀort is positive over some range
as long as a∗ > 0 and e∗ > 0. Taking the partial derivative of utility we get
ua = −2a− e− a∗ which is positive as long as a < 12(a∗ − e). Suppose alter-
native employment gives an operator utility u0. To capture the importance
of a balanced work eﬀort let y = ae.
There is no uncertainty in the model simply because this aspect of in-
centives and motivation is unimportant for the issues we are concerned with
here. We also disregard the talents of the operators, although the quality
of the workers certainly have an impact on productivity. It is well known
that introducing monetary incentives can increase the average skills level in
a firm, since high ability workers will benefit more than low ability workers
from the introduction of performance pay, see Lazear (2000). Our data is
on team performance and cannot discern individual talents from eﬀort. We
do not consider this to be a major problem for in our case. In the empirical
section we show that the impact of the pay reform came immediately after
it was introduced. There were now new reqruitment to the teams we study
at that time.Another point is that even in the longer run the self selection
of high ability workers reported in Lazear (2000) is less relevant when team
performance is rewarded. With team bonuses high skilled workers have to
share their output with the whole team (in our case nine other workers).
4.1 The principal-agent model
The canonical economic model of labour relations builds on the joint assump-
tions of rationality and egoism. Workers calculate their own material payoﬀ
of exerting eﬀort on diﬀerent tasks, and allocate their energy where their
personal gains are maximized. They do not consider how their own behavior
aﬀect the principal’s outcome, which means that λ = 0 in (2). The principal-
agent model does not rule out intrinsic motivation (a∗ and e∗ can be positive
numbers), but it assumes that intrinsic motivation cannot be aﬀected by the
principal. The agent takes compensation (w) as given and chooses a and e
to maximize u(a, e).
The owners of the firm, often represented by their managers, are equally
selfish and clever. They infer how self seeking workers react to organizational
changes, for example to changes in the magnitude and structure of their
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compensation, and given the workers’ response they implement arrangements
that best serve their own interests. More formally, the management takes
account of the incentive constraint and the outside option of their employees
and chooses a policy that maximizes profits π = y − w.
Prior to the reform the workers faced a fixed salary w0. Maximizing
u with respect to a and e with w = w0 yields eﬀort a0 = 2
3
a∗ − 1
3
e∗ and
e0 = 2
3
e∗− 1
3
a∗. In the spring of 2000 the management saw, for reasons we do
not model, a potential for higher sales in the customer service unit. What we
are interested in here is what kind of pay reform the principal-agent model
prescribes in this case.
Note first that within this framework the only reform that can induce
higher sales is one that rewards higher sales with higher income. More for-
mally, to increase a the management must install a pay reform such that
∂w
∂a > 0. Hence, the principal-agent model foresees a reform in which a sales
bonus plays a key role. The exact outline of the bonus depends on the infor-
mation that is available and enforceable, and on the institutional setting the
company operates in. If performance is verifiable, the management might
oﬀer a legally enforceable performance contract to motivate their employees.
If, however, it is diﬃcult to find comprehensive, verifiable performance mea-
sures the firm must employ self-enforcing incentive contracts where monetary
rewards are conditioned on non-verifiable performance measures (objective
or subjective) and compliance is secured by internal punishment of deviant
behavior.8
In our case there are objective, verifiable and accurate sales measures
available. Hence, the principal-agent model predicts that the management
will employ a formal incentive contract with a sales bonus to encourage higher
sales. In addition the model makes a number of predictions with respect to
the outline of the contract.
1. In the principal-agent framework it is the magnitude and structure of
the performance bonuses (relative prices) that determine the impact of
8Firms can employ two kinds of self-enforcing incentive contracts. One alternative is
to increase the salary and announce conditional renewal of the relationship, see Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984). Alternatively, the firm may keep the salary at its old level, but
announce that a bonus is paid if performance is suﬃciently improved. Consult MacLeod
and Malcomson (1998) for a comparison of these alternatives, and MacLeod (2007) for a
comprehensive discussion of enforcement problems and incomplete contracts in long lasting
principal-agent relations.
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a pay reform. The process followed in the outline and implementation of
the reform, and the way incentives are framed and communicated, have
no separate bearing on the workers’ response. Hence, if negotiations
increase the administrative costs of implementing a bonus scheme we
should not expect the management to voluntarily involve the employees
in the outline of the scheme, unless the management obtains useful
information from negotiating with its employees.
2. The generosity of the bonus scheme, measured as the rent workers re-
ceive (utility above outside option), does not in itself aﬀect eﬀort when
agents are oﬀered a legally enforceable incentive contract. Hence, if the
firm includes a sales bonus that increases the utility of the workers, the
model predicts that it will, if possible, reduce the fixed wage element
in the compensation scheme.
3. The multi-task problem is a notorious quandary in the principal-agent
model. It arises because selfish agents tend to neglect responsibilities
that are not explicitly rewarded in the contract. The customer service
consultants we study work in a relatively complex work environment.
Suppose for simplicity that the principal can observe and verify sales
eﬀort, but not service eﬀort, and oﬀers a compensation scheme w =
wb+ba. Maximizing u with respect to a and e when w = wb+ba yields
eﬀorts a = 2
3
[a∗ + b]− 1
3
e∗ and e = 2
3
e∗− 1
3
[a∗ + b] . The latter formula
envisages the multi-task problem. Increasing the sales incentives b
induces higher sales eﬀort but at the expense of lowering service eﬀort.
The principal-agent model predicts that the management of the call
centre will try to balance the sales bonus with a reward on service
provision.
4. Team incentives tend to be unproductive in the standard economic in-
centive model, since selfish individuals are inclined to free ride on oth-
ers’ work eﬀort. The principal-agent model therefore predicts incentive
contracts based on individual performance measures, unless individual
performance data are not too costly to obtain (compared with more ag-
gregate performance measures). If team incentives are used, the model
predicts that the management will organize the work environment such
that individual workers can be monitored by peers or by supervisors.
5. A final issue that is discussed in the principal-agent model is the ratchet
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problem. The problem arises when the implementation of monetary
incentives induces the employees to strategically lower their current
eﬀort in order not to measured against tougher standards in the future.
To avoid strategic under-performance, the management must commit
not to let future standards depend on current behavior. The principal-
agent model predicts that the management recognize this problem and
arrange matters so as to avoid it.
4.2 Extended motivation
The principal-agent model has been criticized by sociologists, psychologists
and other analysts outside the economics profession. Economists are well
aware that individual behavior is not fully described by this simple model
but consider it to be a useful approximation that improves our understanding
of social interaction inside firms and other organizations. However, over the
last two decades a large body of evidence has been collected by experimental
economists, indicating that many individuals have motivations that extend
their own narrow self interests, and that these motivations have important
implications for the design and impact of monetary incentives in work rela-
tions. Reciprocity and fairness are examples of other regarding motivations
that have gained a lot of attention in the recent literature.9
When we extend the motivation of employees it is no longer the case that
the management must install a sales bonus to induce higher sales eﬀort in
the call centre. Reciprocity motivated workers have social preferences which
dispose them to respond to like with like. If workers are oﬀered favorable
employment conditions, for example if they are compensated openhandedly
relative to some reference situation, they are motivated to exert personally
costly eﬀort to enhance the productivity of the firm.10 Formally, if the work-
ers perceive the contract to be good willed and generous λ will increase, and
an increase in λ induces the operators to exert higher eﬀort on both tasks.
9Rotemberg (2006) discusses the importance of reciprocity at workplaces, Fehr and
Schmidt (2006) gives an overview of the experimental literature on reciprocity and fairness
and Sobel (2005) gives a comprehensive discussion of reciprocity in social exchange.
10Reciprocity has a negative side. If workers are reciprocity motivated one may even
observe that the introduction of performance pay lowers the workers’ eﬀort. This could
happen if the workers perceived the bonus to be unfair and unkind. Experimental evidence
indicates that explicit incentives can backfire motivation that relies on rule compliance,
reciprocity and intrinsic motivation, see Fehr and Falk (2002) for an overview.
15
Hence, in a model with reciprocity motivated workers even a generous in-
crease in the fixed salary could increase sales in the centre. But, of course,
there is nothing in this framework that prevents the management from using
a performance pay to motivate their workers. However, if workers are moti-
vated by other-regarding concerns and process-regarding concerns this have
profound implications for the design and impact of performance pay. The list
below should be contrasted with the one in the principal-agent section.
1. If the employees care about the generosity and fairness of a reform,
they will presumably be concerned with the procedures the firm follow
when they design and implement a reform. Hence, one should not be
surprised if the management included the workers in the reform process.
2. If reciprocity is an important motivation among the employees, then it
may not be in the best interest for the principal to seize all the surplus
generated by the reform. Leaving some rents with the employees will
increase their λ and induce them to exert higher eﬀort Hence, the
model with extended motivation does not predict that the inclusion of
a bonus should be fully oﬀset by a reduction in the fixed salary.
3. A generous but incomplete bonus scheme will be less exposed to the
multi-task problem if workers are reciprocity motivated. Suppose for
example that the management installs a generous sales bonus that is
not balanced with a bonus on service provision. In the principal-agent
model such a bonus will lead to severe multi-task problems. The
problem is not so pressing if workers are reciprocity motivated. A
generous sales bonus increases λ and a higher λ implies that the agents
are inclined to exert more service eﬀort to generate income for the
principal.11
4. Another implication of extending the motivation beyond strict self in-
terest is that the free rider problem traditionally associated with team
incentives become less pressing. Reciprocity motivated workers are con-
ditional cooperators; they prefer to exert high eﬀort if their co-worker
work hard. Hence with reciprocity motivation there are two equilibria
in a team production game, one in which they all work hard and one
in which eﬀort is low.
11See Fehr and Schmidt (2005) for an experiment where principals can choose diﬀerent
compensation schemes in a multitask environment.
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5. Note also that reciprocity and fairness motivated principals are less
concerned with designing explicit incentive contracts based on objec-
tive, court enforceable performance measures. Reciprocity is in itself
a contract enforcement device; reciprocity motivated principals do not
want to renege on a promised bonus if workers perform well. The
ratchet problem is therefore not so acute when principals and agents
have motivations that extend their own material self interests. 12
5 Assessing the design of the pay reform
This section addresses two questions: How much do we have to bend and
stretch the principal agent model in order to make sense of the outline of
the pay reform. How much more of the design do we grasp if we extend the
motivation of the management and the employees? To answer these questions
we use information about the design of the pay reform and more subjective
or intentional information gathered from interviews of the management.
5.1 The initial scheme
Given the aim of the management it is perfectly in line with the standard
principal-agent model to observe a signed, explicit, enforceable incentive con-
tract in which a sales bonus plays a prominent role. The fact that the overall
bonus depended on two additional performance measures also squares well
with this model: The primary reason for introducing a pay reform was to
increase sales, but the management were worried that a pure sales bonus
would tempt the operators to neglect other important tasks, like answering
calls and provide high quality services to existing customers.
The use of a team based bonus is harder to reconcile with the principal-
agent model. Individual performance is recorded in the centre and there are
few complementarities between individual work tasks at the centre. Hence,
there are no technological reasons for choosing a team based scheme. When
we inquired about the reasons for choosing a team based bonus, the man-
agement told us they had indeed, considered the possibility of free riding,
12See Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) for an elaboration on reicprocity and com-
mitment and Chaudauri (1998) for discussion (and experiments) of reciprocity and the
ratchet problem in a dynamic principal agent model.
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i.e. that a team based scheme could dilute individual incentives for increas-
ing sales eﬀort. But they concluded that this was not a likely outcome for
two reasons. The fact that each team worked in an open oﬃce landscape
enabled both peers and team leaders to monitor and discipline individual
workers. The management also believed that team work was more enjoyable,
and that a team based tournament would create a kind of team spirit that
could boost individual eﬀort. They argued, without being explicit about it,
along the lines of Akerlof (1982); team work may foster motivations that
underpins norms of high eﬀort (no cheating). Another reason for using a
team bonus mentioned by the management, was that it would reduce the
administrative costs associated with managing the scheme. Furthermore, a
team bonus was preferred by the employees.
Another key feature of the bonus scheme was that the overall bonus de-
pended on the outcome of a tournament among the teams. The traditional
principal-agent argument in favour of relative performance evaluation is that
it reduces the workers’ income risks since it eliminates common noise in the
performance measures. In the principal-agent model this advantage must be
weighed against the possibility that the agents engage in sabotage. None
of these arguments were mentioned by the management when we asked why
eﬃciency and costumer service was based on relative performance. The
management of the call centre had been given a fixed amount of money to
establish a pay reform, and one way to make sure that total bonus payment
did not exceed their “bonus budget” was to use a tournament based incen-
tive scheme. However, the operators did not accept a bonus system that
was solely based on relative performance. They preferred competing against
prefixed standards established in negotiations between the worker represen-
tatives and the management. Thus, the contract was a compromise between
the system preferred by the management and the system preferred by the
employees.
It is not easy to rationalize the non-linearity of the sales bonus (recall
that sales above 130% of the budget did not trigger any extra bonus). One
could argue that putting a cap on the sales bonus was done to limit the
“too-much-focus-on-sales” problem. But the multi-task problem had already
been handled by letting the bonus depend on two additional performance
measures. When we asked about the cap on the sales bonus, the management
alluded to a fairness argument; if a team sold more than 130% of its budget
this clearly indicated that the target was set too low, and it would be unfair
to reward the teams in this case. Another argument was budgetary concerns,
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without any ceiling the total cost of the pay scheme was diﬃcult to estimate.
One aspect of the reform that seems particularly diﬃcult to account
for within the principal-agent model is the generosity of the bonus scheme.
The bonus increased the workers’ average compensation with approximately
7%. Standard incentive theory instructs the management to reduce the fixed
salary component to extract the rent workers achieve from the bonus. This
did not happen in our case. Neither can the principal-agent model explain
the endeavour the management made to negotiate a bonus scheme with the
workers, nor the many concessions they made in order to implement a reform
that was endorsed by the workers. A management behaving like a standard
economic principal, facing a standard economic agent, ought to concentrate
on getting the prices (bonuses) right. They should not be concerned with
procedural fairness, or how the workers interpret the intentions behind the
bonus scheme. These issues regarding the implementation and design of the
reform are much easier to explain in models that extend the motivation of
the employees. If workers are reciprocity motivated it can be in the strict
self interest of the firm (management) to negotiate a reform that gives the
employees considerable rents.
When we inquired about the generosity of the reform and about the con-
sensus oriented process leading to the design of the reform, the management
did indeed talk about the importance of creating ownership and a win-win
situation in order to motivate the employees. But it also became clear that
with respect to the process behind the implementation of the reform they
did not have much choice. In order to implement a permanent performance
pay scheme the company had to reach an agreement with the union repre-
senting the employees. The company was committed to these procedures
by a treaty signed by the employer and employee organization of which this
company was a member..But at another level the company had a choice since
it could have implemented a temporary bonus campaign with the same con-
tent as the permanent incentive contract. In that case the management
could have designed incentives without entering into any negotiations with
the employees. That is exactly what the management did in 2004 when they
decided not to renew the incentive contract.
Based on these observation we conclude that the principal-agent model
predicts fairly well the design of the contract we examine. There are charac-
teristics of the contract that does not fall directly out of the principal-agent
model, but many of these features can be explained if we take account of
institutional constraints that the management of the service unit operated
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faced. For example, the management of the call centre preferred a tourna-
ment, and a cap on the sales bonus, in order to make sure that the cost of
the program did not exceed the performance pay budget they received from
the top management. And given that the management wanted to introduce a
permanent performance pay program they were forced, by union agreements,
to negotiate the shape of the reform with worker representatives.
5.2 Changes in the scheme
It is tempting to interpret the changes in the incentive scheme as the outcome
of a rational learning process. The management implemented the scheme
they thought would increase sales without degrading other services provided
by the call centre. When they learned how the bonus scheme actually worked,
they adjusted it to make it more eﬀective. What did the management learn?
Apparently, their main lesson was that the multi-task problem was tougher
than anticipated. When they realized this the managment took measures to
curb dysfunctional behavior. The initial scheme was based on the number of
sold insurance products, which, according to the management, induced the
operators to oﬀer insurance at a discount price to individuals with bad risks.
To overcome these problems the management decided - in 2003 - to reward
not only the number of products but also the profitability of sold insurance
products. At the same time the management introduced a bonus associated
with "quality of work" in order to avoid that the operators, being in a hurry
to wrap up paperwork, made omissions and mistakes in the contracts that
was sent to the customers. The management also introduced a bonus for
improvements in the overall service level at the centre, which had fallen to a
disastrous low level in 2003.
Why did not the management foresee these problems when they intro-
duced performance pay? Perhaps they did not think through all the ways in
which the operators could bend their behavior to take advantage of the bonus
scheme? Or perhaps they hoped that reciprocity incentives would limit the
problem, i.e. they hoped that the consensus and the generosity of the reform
would prevent the operators from exploiting it. We do not know, but irre-
spective of the reason why the initial contract was incomplete the story above
is one of rational learning; the management observed the operators behavior
and updated their beliefs about the operators’ type and the complexity of
their jobs, and adjusted the scheme according to their new beliefs.
We believe this interpretation captures an essential element of the process.
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But it is probably not the whole story. First, many of the changes were
grounded on insuﬃcient information. The management did not collect enough
hard information about the profitability of sales, or mistakes made by the
consultants, before they included these indicators in the scheme. They did
not collect this information although the data were available. Hence, several
changes in the scheme seem to be based on a vague notion, a hunch, that the
initial contract generated certain dysfunctions that needed to be corrected.
Second, some of the performance indicators that were introduced at later
stages do not square well with the decisions made by a rational, learning
and self interested principal. The claims ratio, for example, was based on
insurance products sold the previous year. This performance measure was
operative in exactly one year, that is, it was abolished just at the time when
it should start to bite. Likewise, linking the team bonus to the service level
of the whole customer service centre (as was done in 2004) seems futile from
this perspective, since each team only had only a small impact on this mea-
sure. There are also performance indicators at the team level that are highly
correlated with the service level.
Hence, some of the changes that were made, and also the mere frequency
of changes, indicate that in addition to rational learning there was an element
of more or less blind groping for a functional scheme. Another explanation for
the frequent changes in the design of the bonus scheme is that in a hierarchy
of managers many individuals feel that they have to take initiatives and
induce changes in order to signal strength and decision power.
6 Assessing the impact of the reform
In this section we present performance data. We describe how the operators
responded to the introduction of performance pay, and how they adjusted
their behavior to changes in the scheme. Finally we use our data to ad-
dress why the operators responded as they did. We start, however, with a
description of our data.
6.1 Data
Our data covers the period from week 38 in 2000 to week 52 in 2004. Phone
data are automatically stored in a telephone base. Each incoming (and outgo-
ing) call is automatically registered in this database. It contains information
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about the duration of call, the waiting time and several other statistics. We
have consistent data from 9 teams, and at the team level we have weekly
data on
• Hours logged on
• Number of sold units
• Duration of a call (in seconds)
• Number of answered calls
In addition we have aggregate data for the service centre on;
• Total number of incoming calls
• Total number of answered calls
• The service level (which is an index that signifies how fast a cus-
tomer that calls get in contact with an operator — the higher the service level
the lower is the customers waiting time)
6.2 Descriptive statistics
To get a first impression of the impact of the reform, we compare performance
before and after the reform in Table 1.
[Table 1 here]
In order to adjust for seasonal variations in the data we compare the same
period before the reform and after the reform. There are three variables in
Table 1 that need explanation. CPS is an acronym for calls per sale, it is the
average number of calls needed to sell one insurance product over the relevant
period. CPS is the inverse of p in the sales equation (1). The service level
is a measure that captures the average waiting time for the customers that
contact the centre. A service level of 80 implies that the average waiting time
before a customer gets assistance is 20 seconds. A lower service level means
a longer waiting time. Eﬃciency is the number of answered calls divided on
the number of hours the operators are logged on the phone system. Recall
that eﬃciency is one of the performance measures in the tournament between
the teams. 13
Comparing sales before and after the reform we find that sales are up
approximately 15 %. Sales increased for two reasons, the teams answered
13The outcome of the tournament was also based on the ratings from a random sample
of customers. Since we do not have data on this variable in the period before the reform,
we have not included it in the table.
22
more calls and they needed fewer calls to sell an insurance product (CPS
dropped). Eﬃciency is also up after the introduction of the reform, but not
primarily because the operators answered more phones, at least not from 2002
and onwards, but because they logged less on the phone system. Another
pattern that stands out in the table is the decline in the service level over
this period.
6.3 Empirical analysis of sales
Given that the aim of the reform was to increase sales, Table 1 indicates
that it was successful. However, to make more confident conclusions we
must control for other confounding factors that can explain the patterns
we observe in Table 1.Operators can increase sales in two ways; answer more
calls or sell insurance to a higher fraction of assisted customers (reduce CPS).
To minimize the noise in our estimation of sales productivity we focus on
the development in CPS. This measure does not depend on the number of
incoming calls, nor on changes in a team’s workforce. To assess the impact of
the reform we run a fixed eﬀect panel regression with CPS as the dependent
performance variable.
Focusing on CPS as the performance indicator solves some identification
problem but one major problem remains. CPS clearly depends on the rela-
tive attractiveness of the company’s products. If this company spent more
resources on marketing, reduced its’ product prices, or something else hap-
pened that increased the demand for it’s products, this would also reduce
CPS, since those calling the centre would on average be more inclined to
buy insurance. Hence a drop in CPS can either be caused by increased sales
eﬀort (or talents) of the operators, or by an increase in the demand of the
products sold by the company. To control for changes in the demand for
insurance products we include sales in other divisions, not aﬀected by the
pay reform (sother), as a control. We also included the number of incoming
calls (incalls) and the service level (slevel) as explanatory variables.
Sales in other divisions and incoming calls are clearly exogenous to CPS.
The relationship between CPS and the service level is more intricate. When
the service level is low team leaders are instructed to focus solely on answering
calls. Hence if these instructions are followed a low service level ought to
increase CPS. But there is also a causal eﬀect that goes the other way; if
operators work hard and sell insurance to a higher fraction of customers they
tend to be less available, due to paper work etc., for answering calls and this
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will reduce the service level in the customer service unit.. To get around
this endogenety problem we regress CPS on predicted service level ( dslevel),
which is based on lagged values of the service level.
We find large productivity diﬀerences (variation in CPS) between the
teams in our data. A possible explanation is heterogeneity in the skills of
the team leaders. There has been three replacements of team leaders in our
data, all happened in 2003. One team got a new leader in week 10, another
in week 32 and the third team leader was replaced in week 38. We construct
dummies denoted leader that is zero over the whole period for teams that
did not change their leader. For the three teams that replaced their leaders
this dummy is zero before the change and one thereafter.
The most general equation we estimate is given by
CPSit = αi+
16X
q=1
μqquarterq+βileaderit+γincallt+νsothert+λ dslevelt+εit.
(3)
CPSit is the average number of calls needed to sell an insurance prod-
uct for team i in week t. On the right hand side we have a team specific
dummy, quarterly dummies for each post-refom quarter, a dummy that cap-
tures leader replacement, incoming calls, sales in other divisions, service level
and an error term. Note that we use the predicted value of service level as
an explanatory variable.14
Mean and standard deviations for the continuos explanatory variables are
presented in Table 2. Table 3 and 4 give regression results for three variants
of our empirical model. Model 1 in Table 3 contains only team specific eﬀects
(the αi’s), a dummy for the reform which is zero until week 8 of 2001 and one
thereafter, a time trend and the controls discussed above. Team 9 is used
as a reference category for the team specific eﬀects. Thus, the estimated
α6 = −0.589 means that team 6 needs around 0.6 fewer calls per sale than
team 9, all else equal. All team specific eﬀects are statistically significant.
Moreover, the pay reform reduced CPS significantly. The estimate of the
bonus reform dummy is −0.74, which means that the pay reform reduced the
number of calls per sale with almost 10 percent . The control variables have
the predicted eﬀect on CPS. An increase in incoming calls increase CPS; the
more customers that are calling the less must the operators strive to reach
14The estimated service level in period t is given by: dslevelt = α+αi+P16q=1 μqquarterq+
γincallt + υsother + βileaderit +
P2
j=1 ηjlagj(slevel) + bεit
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the sales target. Sales in other divisions reduces CPS while the service level
increases CPS.
[Table 3 here]
Model 2 extends Model 1 by including dummies for leader replacements.
Interestingly, all leader replacement dummies are highly significant. Two
replacements lowered sales productivity in the teams, while one replacement
(team 8) induced a major improvement in the performance of that team. I A
thorough discussion of team leader eﬀects is outside the scope of this paper,
but we think it is interesting to note that the leaders seem to have such a
significant impact on the productivity of a team.
Model 3 gives more detailed information about the change in sales pro-
ductivity caused by the reform. In this model we have replaced the time
trend and the reform dummy with quarterly dummies. The quarterly post-
reform dummies are measured against the pre-reform period that runs from
week 38 in 2000 until week 8 in 2001. Note that the first post-reform quarter
is an extended quarter; it ranges from first week of March until the last week
of June 2001. The estimates of the quarterly dummies are depicted in Figure
2.
[Table 4 and Figure 2 here]
The first result that stands out in Table 4 is the drop in CPS immedi-
ately after the incentive contract was introduced. This model suggest that
approximately 13 percent fewer phones were needed in order to sell an in-
surance product in the second quarter of 2001, compared to the pre-reform
level of CPS on 8.1. In the second and third quarter of 2003 there is an even
larger drop in CPS. This apparent increase in productivity is due to the fact
that the insurance company we study purchased the portfolio of customers
from another company. Each contract in this portfolio had to be converted
into the customer base of “our” insurance company. The consultants at the
service centre were assigned to the job, but were reluctant to carry out the
work. They argued it would impede their chances of reaching the sales tar-
get in the bonus scheme. To get the job done, the management agreed to
let each converted insurance policy count as a sold insurance product. The
conversion job started in March 2003 and lasted for approximately half a
year. This then explains the large drop in CPS in the 2. and 3. quarter of
2003.
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The third pattern that needs an explanation is the reduction in CPS
that came during the second and third quarter of 2004 and that levelled
oﬀ in the last quarter of 2004. We believe this increase in productivity
came because the management individualized the sales bonus. However, we
postpone further discussions of this change until the next section where we
address what the data can tell us about the underlying motivation of the
operators. At this stage we are simply interested in identifying the impact
the performance pay had on sales productivity. To this end it is instructive
to focus on the first quarters after the introduction of the reform. Based on
the results we conclude that the pay reform caused a significant increase in
the operators sales eﬀort.
6.4 Agents or angels
The fact that the reform increased sales eﬀort does not identify the underlying
motivation of the operators. Selfish workers will increase their eﬀort to sell
insurance after the introduction of a sales bonus, but so will reciprocity and
fairness motivated operators if they find the pay reform agreeable. There
are indeed several indications that the operators appraised the reform to be
both generous and fair: (i) The management pursued a consensus line; the
reform was shaped together with worker representatives and the scheme was
approved both by the management and the workers15 (ii) The management
added the bonus to the existing salary, which implied a substantial wage
increase for the employees. (iii) The turn-over rate in the centre fell from
around 20% before the reform to well below 10% after the reform. (iv) In
a survey conducted among the customer service consultants a year after the
pay reform, over 80% of the consultants reported that the bonus scheme had
improved their work gratification. Hence, since the reform gave the workers
both self- and other-regarding incentives to increase eﬀort, the decline in CPS
does not tell us anything about the aptness of the principal-agent model. .
.
In order to discern the underlying motivation that produced the drop
15One could object that including the workers in the design process should not be taken
as a sign of generousity and fairness as long as this precedure was dictated by a union
agreement. But this is mistaken. The point is that the management could have bypassed
the workers by using short term incentive campaigns instead of introducing a permanent
performance pay scheme. This is what the management did in 2004 when they refused
to renew the incentive contract.
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in CPS, we need to look further into our data. One identification strategy
is to consider to what extent the operators gamed and exploited the bonus
scheme to their own advantage (and to the disadvantage of the firm). As
noted in the theoretical section the principal-agent model predicts that the
workers will exploit a pay scheme to their own advantage, irrespective of how
fair and generous the scheme is. Standard economic agents disregard tasks
that are not explicitly rewarded, and they try to find easy ways to improve
indicators that are rewarded. Reciprocity and fairness motivation can miti-
gate the multi-task problem. Reciprocity motivated workers will, if they are
oﬀered a generous but incomplete or biased incentive scheme, improve their
performance in a balanced way in order not to harm the company.
The frequent changes in the bonus scheme that described in section 5,2
(and in Figure 1) strongly indicate that the workers took advantage of the
fact that the initial contract was incomplete. The management included
profitability of sales as a performance measure to prevent the consultants
from selling insurance to the wrong individuals (bad risks) at a discounted
price. The management started to punish mistakes in the contract as an
attempt to make the consultants pay more attention to the paper work that
had to be done after a sale was registered. Finally, the management decided
to withdraw from the negotiated contract because they suspected some of
the teams to take advantage of the fact that they were compensated for sick
absence among team members.
Another noteworthy pattern in Table 1 is the decline in the time operators
were logged on the phone system in 2002 and 2003. This pattern reduced
the service level at the call centre and this became a major concern for the
management. Why did it happen? A plausible explanation is that the agents,
after an initial period where they both logged more on the phone system and
answered more phones, learned that they could increase eﬃciency simply
by logging less on the phone system. Recall that eﬃciency was defined
as the number answered calls divided on the hours logged on the phone
system. In Table 1 we can see that in weeks 38 — 52 in 2002 and 2003 the
consultants answered fewer phones, but their eﬃciency nevertheless increased
because they were less logged on the phone system. This pattern is easy to
understand from the principal-agent perspective, and it is well worth asking
why the management defined eﬃciency in this way; why was eﬃciency defined
as the number of answered calls divided on hours logged on the phone system;
why not only as the number of answered calls. The management told us
they had to define eﬃciency like this in order to induce the operators to
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do work away from the phone system. Every now and then the customer
service consultants had to do paper work or other work away from the phone
system. In order not to punish teams that were instructed to log oﬀ the
phone system the management, in negotiations with worker representatives,
decided to divide the number of answered calls on hours logged on the phone
system. Our conjecture, based on the data we have is that this arrangement
was exploited by the teams; they logged oﬀ the phone system strategically,
that is in order to gain terrain in the tournament, even though this reduced
the service level in the call centre and harmed the company.
In order to examine this conjecture we run a fixed eﬀects regression similar
to model 3, but with hours logged on the phone system as the dependent
variable. As explanatory variables we include a time trend, a dummy for the
three last quarters in 2004 and we also control for service level, sales in other
channels and incoming calls. We also include dummies for the conversion
quarters.
[Table 4 here]
The time trend in hours logged on the phone system is negative and sta-
tistically significant, which confirms the pattern indicated in Table 1. There
is a sharp negative deviation from this trend during the months when the
consultants renewed the portfolio of insurance contracts that were acquired
from another company. This is as expected; during that period many opera-
tors were taken away from their phones to convert the acquired portfolio into
their own customer base. In the last three quarters of 2004 the management
reduced the importance of eﬃciency in the bonus scheme. According to our
conjecture the operators should then start to log more on the phone system.
The dummy for the last three quarters is positive, but not significant. Taken
together the results in table 5 suggest that the operators exploited the bonus
scheme to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of the company. If
the operators were strongly motivated by reciprocity and fairness concerns
they would not take advantage of the scheme in this way.
Another way we can use our data to assess the importance of fairness and
reciprocity motivation, is to consider how the workers’ responded when the
management left the consensus line and implemented a new bonus scheme by
dictate. It is reasonable to evaluate this change as an unfriendly act by the
management. Not only did the managment deviate from procedural fairness,
they also abolished compensation due to sickness absence. In addition the
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management individualized the sales bonus. This move towards individual
bonuses was against the will of the worker representatives, they preferred a
team based scheme. Hence, if fairness and reciprocity are important motiva-
tions we should expect a subsequent drop in the workers sales productivity.
The new regime was introduced in the second quarter of 2004. If we
look at Table 4 there is a large and significant reduction in CPS in the
second quarter of 2004. CPS is also very low in the 3. quarter of 2004, but
increases in the 4. quarter of 2004. But even in the last quarter of 2004
the productivity is high compared the last quarter in previous years. Our
data then strongly indicate that the new regime increased the sales eﬀort
of the consultants. Hence, the customer service consultants reacted exactly
opposite of what we should expect if their behavior were strongly influenced
fairness and reciprocity considerations.
We do not have to stretch the principal-agent model very far in order
to explain why the sales eﬀort was higher under the new performance pay
regime introduced in the second quarter of 2004. One of the key changes
compared to the initial bonus scheme was the introduction of an individual
performance bonus. In the second quarter of 2004 half of the sales bonus
was based on individual sales, and half of it depended on team sales. In
the third quarter the individual part was increased to three quarters of the
total sales bonus. The principal-agent model would explain the increase in
productivity as an alleviation of the free rider problem associated with a
bonus that depended on team performance.
7 Conclusion
We have followed the evolution of a pay for performance reform over several
years. We have collected detailed data, both on the design and impact of the
reform. A first aim of presenting our case was to depict how diﬃcult it is to
use explicit performance bonuses in a multifaceted work environment. We
think that both the complexity of the initial bonus scheme and its frequent
amendment over time, underscores this message.
Our more ambitious goal was to use our data to assess the importance
of other-regarding motivations, like fairness and reciprocity, at a workplace.
The traditional economic framework used to study the design and impact of
economic incentives presumes individuals that are completely self-regarding,
individuals that only care about their own material welfare. This assumption
29
does not square well with the results from recent laboratory experiments
resembling work relations, which show that principals and agents have social
preferences that have important implications for the design and impact of
economic incentives.
Our findings are mixed. We argue that the pay reform implemented in
2001 appealed to a broader set of motivations than the selfishness of the op-
erators. There is, however, nothing in the operators’ response that indicates
a strong fairness and reciprocity motivation. On the contrary, we argue that
their adjustment was totally in line with how rational self-seeking agents
would respond to a pay reform. Our data also show that the management
adjusted the initial pay reform as they learned more about the motivation
and behavior of the operators.
Compared with recent experimental studies, which find that reciprocity
and fairness are strong motivators in work relations, our results are surprising.
However, we do not want to overstate this disparity. We are not claiming
that other-regarding motivations, such as fairness concerns and reciprocity
are non-existent or unimportant at authentic workplaces. A problem with
case studies is validity: it is diﬃcult to assess to what extent the patterns
detected in one case generalize to other cases. There are certain idiosyncrasies
associated with the workplace and pay reform we study that need to be taken
into account before we apply our findings in a general discussion of reciprocity
and fairness motivations at workplaces. For example, we study a workplace
where the workforce is young and the turnover relatively high, which means
that most of the employees consider their job as temporary. Furthermore,
the degree of surveillance was very high also before the pay for performance
reform was introduced. It is possible that this particular work environment
does not foster other-regarding motivations, or that it systematically selects
individuals that are not reciprocity and fairness motivated.
Another relevant point is that we study a reform where reciprocity and
fairness incentives are paired with explicit performance bonuses. It is possible
that the presence of explicit monetary incentives totally overshadows other-
regarding motivations. If fairness and reciprocity incentives only work well
in the absence of explicit performance bonuses, this is in itself an important
observation that should be explored further. Our study then constitutes one
piece in a broader program that examines how diﬀerent institutions promote
or prevent various kinds of motivations, and how these motivations interact
with each other.
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1:2001: Pay for performance 
is introduced. The bonus is 
team based and depends on 
sales, efficiency and 
customer approval. Only 
long term sick absence is 
compensated 
2001 2002 2003 2004
1:2002 Short term sick 
absences are 
compensated if the 
workers have a medical 
certificate confirming 
their sickness.  
Week 8, 2001: The 
incentive contract 
between the company 
and the customer 
service consultants is 
signed.   
1:2003:  Two indicators 
of the profitability of 
sales, tariff discount 
and claims ratio are 
included in the 
tournament 
1:2004:  The 
profitability 
indicators are 
relegated from the 
scheme.  
2:2004: The company leaves the 
consensus line and implements a 
bonus scheme by dictate.  No 
compensation for sick absence. The 
sales bonus is partly individualized.  
Efficiency is abolished and “Quality 
of work” and customer renewal are 
introduced as performance 
indicators.  No link between the 
rank in the tournament and the 
sales bonus.     
3:2004 Efficiency is 
reintroduced in a 
different form.  The 
sales bonus is further 
individualized.   
Figure 1:  The evolution of the bonus scheme. 
The number preceding the year indicates which quarter the change was implemented. 
 
  
Table 1:  The evolution of performance.  
Mean and standard deviation for 9 teams.  
 
 
 CPS Efficiency Hours 
logged on 
Answered 
calls  
Sold 
products 
Service 
level 
Incoming 
calls 
Week 38 
2000 – 
week 8 
2001 
8.49 
(3.32) 
4.21 
(0.53) 
 
223.16 
(48.75) 
940.83 
(232.30) 
123.39 
(46.54) 
0.71 
(0.08) 
13600.70 
(2075.44) 
Week 38 
2001 – 
week 8 
2002 
7.11 
(3.13) 
4.77 
(0.72) 
 
227.29 
(61.23) 
1063.11 
(284.92) 
167.13 
(64.52) 
0.66 
(0.18) 
15921.90 
(3013.93) 
Week 38 
2002 – 
week 8 
2003 
7.76 
(3.00) 
4.58 
(0.61) 
 
222.06 
(64.07) 
1015.13 
(297.49) 
142.84 
(53.07) 
0.47 
(0.28) 
16804.70 
(3174.74) 
Week 38 
2003 – 
week 8 
2004 
7.16 
(1.75) 
4.86 
(0.77) 
 
186.75 
(52.92) 
 
907.20 
(264.33) 
130.58 
(40.91) 
0.58 
(0.17) 
17149.00 
(2700.73) 
Week 38 
2004 – 
week 52 
2004 
6.64 
(1.53) 
4.26 
(0.64) 
 
206.17 
(44.34) 
879.73 
(231.21) 
140.60 
(52.19) 
 
0.71 
(0.09) 
14685.50 
(1413.17) 
Table 2: Explanatory variables.  
Mean and standard deviation for the continuous explanatory variables. 
 
 
 Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
Service level (slevel) .54 
(.24)    
Incoming calls 
(incall) 
16798.53      
(3222.29) 
Sales in other 
channels (sother) 
3999.53 
(1197.92) 
N 1998 
Table 3: Calls per sale before and after the reform.  
The dependent variable is calls per sale (CPS).   
Data are from week 38 in 2000 to week 52 in 2004 for 9 teams.  
Models are estimated with dummies for Easter and Christmas weeks (not shown). 
 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
Model 1  
Team specific effects and 
dummy for implementation of 
reform 
Model 2 
Team specific effects and team leader 
change dummies 
Team 1 -0.7646*** 
(0.0000)    
-1.2227*** 
(0.0728)    
Team 2 -0.3340*** 
 (0.0000)     
-0.3340*** 
(0.0000)    
Team 3 -0.1474*** 
(0.0000)    
-0.1474*** 
(0.0000)    
Team 4 0.0098*** 
(0.0000)    
0.0098*** 
(0.0000)    
Team 5 -0.6679*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.6679*** 
(0.0000)    
Team 6 -0.5895*** 
(0.0000)    
-0.5895*** 
(0.0000)    
Team 7 -0.0713*** 
(0.0000)    
-0.4930*** 
(0.0762)    
Team 8 3.6915*** 
(0.0000)    
6.8336*** 
 (0.0970)    
Implementation 
of bonus 
reform 
-0.7425*   
(0.2927)    -0.9420**  
 (0.2670)    
Time trend -0.0063    
(0.0065)    
-0.0025    
 (0.0022)    
Leader change 
team 1 
:: 1.5364*** 
 (0.2441)    
Leader change 
team 7 
:: 1.3131*** 
 (0.2373)    
Leader change 
team 8 
:: -7.3652*** 
 (0.2274)    
Service level 
(slevel) 
0.4887    
(0.2152)    
0.7082*   
(0.3040)    
Inbound calls 
(incall) 
0.0000    
(0.0000)    
0.0001    
 (0.0000)    
Sales in other 
channels 
(sother) 
-0.0001    
(0.0001)    -0.0001*    (0.0000)    
Fully robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***Significant at 0.1 percent level, **Significant at 1 
percent level, *Significant at 5 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
Table 4:  Sales productivity quarter by quarter.  
The dependent variable is calls per sale (CPS).  
Data are from week 38 in 2000 to week 52 in 2004 for 9 different teams.  
Team specific effects and dummies for Easter and Christmas weeks are included, but not shown. 
 
 
Explanatory variables Model 3.  Quarterly time dummies. No time trend 
Q2 (from week 8 to week 26 2001) -1.1184*   
 (0.3712)    
Q3 (third quarter 2001) -1.3591*** 
 (0.2482)    
Q4 (fourth quarter 2001) -1.2082**  
 (0.3176)    
Q5 (first quarter 2002) -1.4171**  
 (0.3284)    
Q6 (second quarter 2002) -1.0615*   
(0.4418)    
Q7 (third quarter 2002) -0.9971*   
(0.3704)    
Q8 (fourth quarter 2002) -0.3761    
(0.3564)    
Q9 (first quarter 2003) -1.0019**  
(0.2613)    
Q10 (second quarter 2003) -1.8351**  
(0.4201)    
Q11 (third quarter 2003) -2.0125*** 
(0.3369)    
Q12 (fourth quarter 2003) -1.0472*   
(0.3793)    
Q13 (first quarter 2004) -1.4615*   
(0.5181)    
Q14 (second quarter 2004)  -1.8200*   
(0.5534)    
Q15 (third quarter 2004) -2.1523**  
(0.5333)    
Q16 (fourth quarter 2004) -1.2033    
(0.5518)    
Leader change team 1 1.6176*** 
(0.3027)    
Leader change team 7 1.4328**  
(0.2872)    
Leader change team 8 -7.1668*** 
(0.2612)    
Service level (slevel) 0.7120    
(0.5489) 
Number of inbound calls (incall)  0.0001*   
 (0.0001)    
Sales in other channels (sother) -0.0002**  
(0.0000)    
Constant 6.5858*** 
(1.0769)    
Fully robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***Significant at 0.1 percent level, **Significant at 1 
percent level, *Significant at 5 percent level 
         
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Quarterly CPS.    
Estimated quarterly dummies in Model 3 – with a 95 percent confidence band. 
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Table 5:  The decline in hours logged on the phone system 
The dependent variable is hours logged on.   
Data are from week 38 in 2000 to week  52 in 2004 for  9 teams. Team specific effects and 
controls for Easter and Christmas weeks are included, but not shown. 
Explanatory variables Model 3.  Quarterly time dummies. No time trend 
Time trend -0.3224**  
 (0.0814)    
 
Q10 (second quarter 2003) -20.4027    
(9.0862)    
Q11 (third quarter 2003) -44.9412**  
(10.1478)    
Dummy for three last quarters 2004  19.9156    
 (14.4543)    
Leader change team 1 -12.5558    
(7.8109)    
Leader change team 7 14.8544    
(8.2672)    
Leader change team 8 -3.7933    
(8.9348)    
Service level (slevel) 106.7239*** 
(10.4289)    
Number of inbound calls (incall) 0.0102*** 
0.0005)    
Sales in other channels (sother) 0.0019    
(0.0014)    
Constant 2.6142    
(9.8018) 
Fully robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***Significant at 0.1 percent level, **Significant at 1 
percent level, *Significant at 5 percent level. 
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